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Introduction: The Burdens of Urban History 
Louis Hartz summed up the mission of his historical generation when he wrote, as  part of 
the rationale for The Liberal Tradition in 1955, that "the way to fully refute a man is to ignore 
him ... and the only way you.can do this is to substitute new fundamental categories for his own, so 
that you are simply pursuing a different path." Hartz was referring to the influence of Charles 
Beard and what Hartz called the "frustration that the persistence of the Progressive analysis of 
America has inspired." He was arguing that his generation had ta stop honoring the progressives 
by contending with them the key to destroying their interpretation of American history was the 
reinvention of American history by means.of new conceptual tools. (1) 
The so-called "progressive" analysis of America which so frustrated Hartz was one that 
held that conflict--economic, social, regional--was the key to understanding it: past. Although 
none of the versions of this view was exactly like another, Richard Hofstadter felt that the overall 
thrust of this interpretation of American history--predominant during the years 1910 to 1950-- 
. . -. 
was best summarized in a passage written by Vernon Louis Parrington: "From the first we have 
been divided into two main parties. ... On one side has been the party of the current aristocracy--of 
church, of gentry, of merchant, of slave holder, or manufacturer--and on the other the party of the 
commonalty--of farmer, villager, small tradesman, mechanic, proletariat. The one has 
persistently sought to check and limit the popular power, to keep the control of the government in 
the hands of the few in order to serve special interests, whereas the other has sought to augment 
the popular power, to make government more responsive to the will of the majority, to further the 
democratic rather than the republican ideal--let one discover this and new light is shed on our 
cultural tendencies." (2) 
Hofstadter's quotation of this view was part of an obituary for the progressive 
interpretation of American history that he wrote less than 15 years after Hartz's book appeared. 
According to Hofstadter, the "tide began to run out" on the progressive interpretation during the 
nineteen fifties when "conflict as  a vitalizing idea began to be contested by the notion of a 
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pervasive American consensus." What had "toppled" the Progressive interpretation--perhaps 
better, allowed his generation to topple it--were new concepts and methods that facilitated 
replacement of the "simple-minded" dualism of the Progressives with a new appreciation for the 
complexity of the American past. Among these new theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approaches,.he wrote in 1968, were freudianism, the sociology of knowledge, functionalism-- 
especially as  presented in the works of Robert Merton--and quantification. Together these 
permitted the introduction of. "the entire sociological penumbra of political life" into historical 
writing. (3) 
Although Hartz and Hofstadter were undoubtedly among the most brilliant and wide- 
ranging of the generation of so-called "consensus" historians, they were by no means the only ones 
who recognized that the supplanting of one historiographical tradition by another requires battles 
a t  the theoretical and methodological as well as  the substantive fronts. In fact, perhaps the most 
important accomplishment of their generation was the borrowing from the social sciences of new 
ways of constructing their interpretation of the American past. Some of the most important 
historiographical "products" of the postwar period were based upon middle range social scientific 
concepts such as latent functions and reference groups from sociology, pluralism from political 
science, status anxiety from social psychology, information and transaction costs from economics, 
etc. Moreover, a s  Ian Tyrell has recently pointed out, it was this postwar turn to the social 
sciences that, in function if not intent, both rescued American history from "more reactionary 
forms of empiricism" and inoculated it for some time against more radical types of analysis such 
as marxism. (4) 
Historians, however, did not "invent" consensus, as  historiographers so often propose. 
Consensus history was merely the historian's moment of a more general transformation of the 
social sciences which began before World War Two and was consolidated soon after it. Beginning 
in the nineteen thirties political science and sociology, too, began a shift from an institutionally 
based and reform-oriented social science to one that was focused more on culture and concerned 
more with stability than reform. While historians shifted from conflict to consensus as a central 
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theme in American history, sociologists and political scientists shifted focus from the ways in 
which American society was problematic to the ways in which it was normative. Moreover, the 
simultaneity of these shifts across the social sciences and their attachment to the development of a 
prestigious empirical social science gave these views of American society past and present 
- enormous legitimacy and staying power. 
. .... For the most part, however,. historians have failed to think very carefully about how these 
- theoretical frameworks have shaped and limited their ability to apprehend and interpret American 
history. This failure originates in the tendency of many historiographers to write about. 
transformations in historical interpretations in relative isolation from parallel transformations in 
the social sciences. The problem has persisted because, until relatively recently, most historians 
have been notoriously reluctant to engage in explicit theoretical debate, and, therefore, sometimes 
simply unaware of the intellectual legacy of their middle-range concepts, or, in the worst cases, 
committed to what David Hackett Fisher has called the "baconian" fallacy, which is the belief that 
they deal only in the "facts," without the need for organizing theoretical frameworks. (5) 
One might have expected that the rise of historically oriented social science would have 
brought these issues to the fore, but, for the most part, it has not. Although historically oriented 
sociologists and political scientists have begun to work with historical data, they have not, on the 
whole, been especially concerned either with the histories of their own disciplines or the 
historiography of the secondary historical sources on which they base their accounts. In fact, 
historical social scientists have tended, ironically, to commit their own version of the error of 
historians by appropriating what they think are "facts" from the works of historians without 
examining the frameworks within which those alleged "facts" are embedded. 
Together, then, historians' relative lack of interest in theory and social scientists' relative 
lack of interest in historiography have set up an  unproductive intellectual exchange in which 
historians have "borrowed" middle-range theory from the social sciences and used it to structure 
their "facts." But then political scientists and sociologists have "borrowed" these "facts" to 
construct the historical accounts on the basis of which they hope to theorize. 
This would be a point of purely epistemological interest were i t  not for the role of such a 
set of exchanges in the construction of the current conception of the relationship between class and 
politics in the American city. Because it was the cockpit of important social, economic, and 
political change and also the locatibn of the most active of the branches of the state in America3 
. history before the.New Deal,. the American city is rightly perceived as one important locus for the 
attempt to "bring the state back in" or put "politics" back into social history. However, after two 
decades of the "new" social history--most of it urban community studies--that has reintroduced the 
vocabulary of class, conflict, and ideology into American history, the conception of urban politics 
remains one of ethnicity, patronage, and non-ideological machines, a view constructed in the 
nineteen fifties. Moreover, this view of urban politics is characteristic of newer work not just in 
history, but also political science and sociology, and it plays a role in recently developed theories of 
both class formation and statebuilding. 
The intellectual history of the construction and appropriation of this view of urban politics 
is a case study of the process outlined above, of the power of the theoretical frameworks of one 
generation to structure the discourse of another. Both by ignoring politics and failing to examine 
critically the theoretical frameworks within which they have perceived it, members of a new 
generation of historical social science have so far failed in their task of "substituting" new 
fundamental categories for those of their predecessors. What some have called the "neo- 
progressive" view of American society continues to carry the burden of a remarkably consensual 
view of American politics. 
The Exceptionable History of American Exceptionalism 
Symptoms of a lack of fit between the "social" and "political" history of the last two 
decades are apparent in a recent series of essays on the process of class and state formation by 
historians and historically oriented political scientists and sociologists. These essays, undertaken 
for the most part  within a framework of a revived interest in American "exceptionalism," reveal 
that  the work of the so-called "new" social history has, for the most part, undermined the social 
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and ideological bases of traditional claims of exceptionalism but, to a great extent, has retained 
those parts having to do with politics. 
For historically-oriented social scientists writing in the era of Hartz and Hofstadter the 
relationship between class and politics in America was  relatively unproblematic. For a variety of 
reasons, including the absence of feudalism, economic abundance, rapid social mobility, or 
essential ideological. consensus, there was no consciousness of class in America. Compared to 
other countries, then, America was "exceptional" because there, as Seymour Martin Lipset has 
argued for almost thirty years now, "the development of working class political consciousness ... 
required an act  of intellectual imagination." (6)  
Armed with both new analyses of American social history and a more supple theory of 
ideology, the "new" social and labor historians have argued, in contrast, that  in both structure and 
ideology the United States and Europe have not been a s  different as exceptionalists might have 
thought. These studies suggest that  structural opportunities for occupational mobility in the 
United States were neither a s  great, nor agreement on fundamentals a s  widespread a s  the old 
exceptionalists argued. Most Americans lived and died in the class of their birth, economic 
dislocation and inequality were a t  least as obvious as  the promise of abundance, and, a s  a result of 
these social and economic facts, a n  implicitly anti-capitalist "producer" ideology of "equal rights" 
was both fairly widespread and fairly well institutionalized. Moreover, this ideology was 
prominent in conflicts both at the point of production and in the political arena. (7) 
These arguments have essentially shifted the terrain from social to political 
exceptionalism. A new generation of commentators on this issue has formulated a rough 
consensus on class formation in America in which, as Sean Wilentz, has put it "politics mattered a 
great deal." Taken together the contributors to this view, including, among others, Wilentz, Eric 
Foner, Jerome Karabel, Ira Katznelson, Amy Bridges, and Martin Shefter contend that  in 
contrast to Europe where economic inequality was joined with a long struggle for political equality, 
in the United States, as Foner has put it (following Alan Dawley) the messages of the economic 
and political sectors were contradictory. Here economic inequality was accompanied by political 
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equality; what Perlman called the "free gift" of the suffrage antedated the emergence of capitalist 
economic institutions. (8) 
More important than the possession of this free gift, of course, was  the way that  i t  was 
organized. Here, too, a surprising unanimity has emerged in this literature around the argument 
that  the ballot box was "the coffin" of class consciousness in America because of the apparent 
openness and equality of the political .system, the organization of politics on the basis of ethnicity, 
territoriality, and patronage, and the institutionalization of politics in political machines which 
rewarded ethnic particularism with divisible material incentives. 
For example, the decline of artisanally based class consciousness is now thought to have 
been brought about in large part  by the appearance of ethnic political machines, which, a s  part of 
a non-ideological party system exploited locality based ethnic divisions "more than anything else" 
and thus produced a split between radieal politics at the work place and the politics of ethnic 
bargaining and accommodation in the neighborhood. The maintenance and manipulation of this 
split throughout the nineteenth century was one of the factors in the post Civil War disruption of 
what David Montgomery has  called the "sense of moral universality among 'the producers"' that  
provided the language of militancy for the nineteenth century working class. (9) 
What is striking about the new political consensus, however, is the disjunction between its 
conception of class and its conception of politics. Both in their essays on exceptionalism and their 
own substantive writings these authors and others consider class to be not a category, but a 
process, class consciousness not a n  attribute, but a project, and class formation in general, to be 
complex, contingent, and historical. This supple understanding of class contrasts with an 
ascriptive and functionalist understanding of politics in these same essays. In the work of the 
labor historians, in particular, while class is a project ethnicity seems primordial, while class 
formation is a complicated process, party formation is almost automatic, while labor leadership is 
courageous, far sighted, and self-conscious, political leadership is craven, manipulative, and non- 
ideological. The construction of class consciousness is rooted in the mutuality of the everyday 
realities of work and neighborhood; this same mutuality--apparently--disappears in the voting 
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booth where non-ideological particularism takes over and the favor, the city permit, the patronage 
job prevail. 
In the works of the historically oriented political scientists, the political aspects of the 
relationship between class and politics are handled more deftly. In particular, these authors 
underline the challenges of party building a t  both the institutional and ideological level. Bridges, 
for example, has emphasized both the necessity of party leaders to mobilize majorities and the 
need of workers to pursue political goals through the parties in her account of the way class and 
politics intersected in the antebellum period. Shefter has included both the decentralized nature of 
the American state and the relative accessibility of its local branch in his explanation of the way 
in which both trade unions and political machines organized working class life in the later 
nineteenth century. (10) 
In the end, however, for both it was the political machines that played the key role. For 
Bridges "the institutions of machine politics coordinated an  accommodation between the working 
classes and their social betters." For Shefter, "at least in the major cities ... machines consolidated 
their position as  the most important vehicle through which the working class participated in 
politics." (11) 
This interpretation now also plays an important role in considerations of the 
"exceptionalism" of the American state. Building on the accounts of Katznelson and Shefter, for 
example, Theda Skocpol has emphasized the "crucial consequences" for public policymaking of the 
subordination of government functions to the patronage needs of the political parties. According to 
Skocpol, a factor in the relatively late development of the American welfare state was the role of 
"patronage democracy" including the "urban political machines based on the ever-renewed 
streams of immigrants flowing into the American industrial working class." Because of patronage 
democracy, politics served primarily "symbolic-expressive and entertainment functions" and was 
not a matter of using parties to articulate demands for policies in the collective interest of wage- 
earners as a class. Instead nineteenth century politics involved "getting out the vote" within "the 
various ethnically and religiously based local residence communities that formed the remarkably 
stable building blocks of grassroots support for the major party organizations." (12) 
Somewhat surprisingly, these understandings of the role of ethnicity, patronage, and 
machines are almost identical to those of the so-called "consensus" historians. For them, for 
example, the patronage based politics of the urban political machine were the perfect response to 
both the functional needs of urban society and the non ideological character of American politics. 
For the generation of the fifties, political machines extended social exceptionalism into politics; for 
current commentators the political machines blocked the transmission of radicalism from society 
into politics. In both cases the conception of politics is society-centered, non-ideological, and 
functionalist. For reasons having to do primarily with its "middle range" theories, much of the 
"new" history has simply "rediscovered" the political propositions of the "old." 
The Liberal Matrix for Political Analysis 
Most current interpretations of urban and community politics in American history have 
been deeply influenced by middle-range theoretical propositions from sociology and political science 
that emerged out of what David Ricci has called the "liberal matrix" of political analysis that was 
constructed in the years immediately following World War Two. To understand the contingency-- 
and contestability--of these frameworks, it is necessary to begin with a brief look a t  the 
intellectual history of this era and the elements of this matrix. (13) 
For the first three or four decades of the twentieth century a reform-oriented "progressive" 
social science paralleled--indeed included some of the same persons as--progressive history, As 
Edward Purcell has written, these political scientists and sociologists believed in the ultimately 
rational nature of the universe and thought that science could lead men to a full understanding of 
the social process and "an intelligent reordering of American institutions in a spirit of social 
harmony." Somewhat ironically, both their own work and the events of the nineteen thirties and 
forties began to undermine these views, however, a s  empirical studies began to reveal "irrational" 
aspects of personality and behavior within the United States and the rise of fascism and the onset 
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of war seemed to confirm these findings outside of it. By the late nineteen thirties and through 
the war  years, both intellectuals a t  large and social scientists within their disciplines turned 
toward a more "realistic" evaluation of both the possibilities of and need for "reform" in America. 
(14) 
In his-recenbbook The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age Richard Pells has described 
aspects of the process by which liberal intellectuals writing in the.nineteen fifties consolidated this 
new view of American politics and society. Convinced tha t  it was necessary to chasten the 
naivete, simplistic dualism, and rationalism of their predecessors, these intellectuals--including, of 
course, those like Hartz and Hofstadter, but also many others--attempted to invent a new 
liberalism that  was based on a more realistic view of human nature in general and American 
society in particular, and that  was, therefore, less likely to unleash the moralistic urge to 
fanaticism and more likely to recognize the remarkable degree' of real social and political progress 
. 
in the United States. (15) 
Finding less conflict and more complexity in American society these intellectuals argued 
that  i t  was both the reality and the glory of American history that  politics was based upon the 
voluntary group, rather than the card-carrying party; ad hoc, cross class, group political alliances, 
rather than class alliances; and the pragmatic search for specific individual or group economic 
gains from politics rather than the moralistic call for the reconstruction of society itself. In this 
new liberal view of American politics, candidates were properly "brokers," parties agencies of 
mediation, and the system as a whole incremental rather than totalistic; inefficient, but less likely 
to destroy itself in pursuit of messianic goals. 
Like most of those who have written about the intellectual history of the postwar 
generation, Pells has abstracted these thinkers from currents in the disciplines within which many 
of them worked and he has  ignored the theoretical contributions of enormously influential social 
scientists who do not fit his definition of "intellectual." Therefore, the way that  the social sciences 
"operationalized" these ideas is not altogether clear in his account. 
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Fortunately, Ricci's thoughtful book, The Tragedy of Political Science provides a case study 
of this process in that  discipline. His analysis is important because i t  emphasizes that  the change 
in political science occurred not just in terms of its propositions about American politics, but also in 
terms of its ways of defining social "science," theory, and method. The components of what he 
calls the "matrix" of liberal discourse were the redefinition of politics--both a s  practiced and as  
analyzed--from a matter of results to a matter of "method," the redefinition of "theory" from 
"Grand" to "behavioral" (or "middle range"), and the refocusing of political analysis from what 
"should be" to what "is." (16) 
Like their representatives in the "intellectual" stream political scientists in the postwar 
period were also worried about the extravagant claims of their prewar "liberal" predecessors. 
Whereas pre-war political scientists believed that  men could be the best judges of their own 
interests and, therefore, that  responsible mass democratic government was both desirable and 
possible, postwar scholars developed thetheory of "elitist" democracy on the basis of precisely the 
opposite propositions. World-wide depression, fascism, and war underlined the "truth" that  men 
were not necessarily the best judges of their interest, that  only better trained and politically 
disciplined elites should participate in politics, and that  politics should involve narrow and non- 
ideological conflict. At its most ideological edge, this change of view shifted the agenda of political 
science from from the question "how can American institutions be changed to facilitate 
democracy" to "how do American institutions facilitate democracy." 
Among the discoveries of such analyses were those contending that  every apparently non- 
democratic aspect of American politics was functional for democracy. Thus, in these years, 
inequality, apathy, declining voter participation, and the absence of political ideology were all 
argued to be positive aspects of American politics: elites were more likely to support democracy, 
thus inequality was good; the ignorant were less likely to vote, thus declining participation was 
good; agreement on the "rules of the game" was less likely to produce fanaticism than argument 
over first political principles, thus the absence of such discussion was a plus, etc. In the writings 
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of some political scientists, in short, everything that  seemed manifestly dysfunctional to 
democracy to their predecessors was now determined to be "latently" functional for democracy. 
The Rehabilitation of the Political Machine 
The changing status of the political machine in the literature of social science was a 
bellweather of this broader change. From the publication of Bryce's American Commonwealth in 
1888 the machine had been the scourge of American politics and the reason that  municipal 
government was the infamous "one conspicuous failure of the United States." For Bryce--who 
was president of the American Political Science Association in 1908--the master conflict in urban 
politics was between the rich, well educated, and the good on the one side, and the corrupt and 
ignorant on the other. In The American Commonwealth the machine linked together the venal 
and the pliable. The boss "sat like a spider, hidden in the midst of his web," with the power to 
dispense places, reward the loyal, and punish the mutinous because he was the best among the 
"knot" of political operators that  "pulled the wires for the whole city," and thereby riveted their 
"yoke" upon it. (17) 
This view of the political machine--which focused on its power and corruption in order to 
speed its removal--was characteristic of most writing on i t  by political scientists until its 
rehabilitation in E. Pendleton Herring's enormously influential 1940 book The Politics of 
Democracy. Herring's book was essentially a paean to American political institutions and an 
i antidote to what he  called "the application of critical standards too high for human attainment" . 
that  tended to produce a sense of frustration and cynicism about American political institutions. 
(18) 
Viewed against the threatening rise of totalitarianism, i t  was the reformer, not the 
"politicianv--Herring minimized the use of the term "bossn--that was the problem. Reformers 
failed to understand the truth tha t  men were not rational, but rather passionate and greedy. 
Because they were, a political "adjuster" was needed to stand for "relativity in the struggle of 
absolute values." Machine politicians performed the vital function of assuring continuity and 
cohesion in an ethnically and economically divided community both by providing services and 
maintaining a political moderation that avoided "the barricades of intransigence." Rather than 
deserving moral opprobrium, they deserved more credit.than they received. In his review of 
Herring's book, E. E. Schattschneider noted that "confronted with the prospect of losing our 
institutions, we look a t  them with new eyes." The transformation of the boss from moral scourge 
to human relations expert was certainly symptomatic of this attitude. (19) 
A similar transformation was going on in sociology, where, a s  Robert Friedrichs has 
pointed out, a pre-war reformed oriented focus on social institutions was replaced by a post-war 
focus on the functional necessities of the "social system." Again the changing status of the 
political machine reflects this transformation. For the "social engineers" of the of the early 
decades of the century the machine was part of a vicious circle that could be broken by an 
informed electorate, for their critics in the fifties, its "latent functions" were critical to the urban 
"system." (20) 
The reform view of the machine predominated when, in 1935, the distinguished sociologist 
F. Stuart Chapin undertook to systematize the institutional approach in sociology in his 
Contemporary American Institutions: A Sociological Analysis. For Chapin a sophisticated 
institutional approach to local government required consideration of not only the "legalistic" 
pattern of government reflected in law and charter, but also the pattern of the less obvious "quasi- 
legal" world of the boss and the political party and the "extra-legal" world of patronage, bribe, and 
corruption. In his view, the need of political parties for funds, business for privileges, and 
criminals for protection led to a sinister link between these worlds. Understanding of the interlock 
between these institutions could lead to the breakage of this "vicious circle" by means of increased 
voter participation and the expansion and professionalization of public services. (21) 
Robert K. Merton took precisely this set of institutional linkages, but reversed their moral 
charge in his classic analysis of the "latent functions" of the political machine which first appeared 
in 1949. The successive editions of Social Theory and Social Structure (in 1949, 1957, and 1968) 
played an enormous role in the redefinition of the social sciences in terms both of "theory" and 
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research agenda. Merton, as is well known, invented the term "middle-range" theory to apply to 
that  category of theory that  lay between "working hypotheses" on the one hand, and "unified 
systems theories" on the other--in essence the same thing as "behavioral theory" in political 
science. Moreover, he made major contributions to such theory, popularizing the concepts of latent 
functions, "reference" groups, and locals and cosmopolitans, to mention only those that  were to 
.. . play.an important role in the reconstruction of American political history. (22) 
Merton offered his famous.distinction between "manifest" and "latent" functions in an 
attempt both to codify and exemplify functionalist thought and to extol its advantages to the other 
social sciences. Such a distinction, he said, clarified the analysis of seemingly irrational social 
patterns and directed attention to theoretically fruitful fields of inquiry. It also precluded "the 
substitution of naive moral judgments for sociological analysis," and in this way the distinction 
also tied him tightly to the overall intellectual and political mission of generation which was, a s  we 
have seen, the replacement of "naive" reformism with "realistic" science. (23) 
Indeed, a s  Alan Ryan has pointed out, like other members of his intellectual generation, 
Merton was "impressed with the unlooked for goodness of the consequences of much social life in 
America." According to Ryan, the only reason for using the term "latent function" was to 
emphasize that  "the good results he is looking a t  are not those which gratify the actors, but those 
that  gratify other people." But this equation of "function" with "good consequence" had a 
deleterious effect on the sociology of this period, when "articles on such topics as 'Some Social 
Functions of Ignorance' turn out to be articles on 'Some Unthought of Good Effects that  Ignorance 
Produces for almost Everyone."' (24) 
In this spirit Merton opened his analysis of the functions of the political machine with a 
critique of the moralistic approaches to it of his predecessors which did not, in fact, explain its 
vitality so much as hope for its extinction. According to Merton, the recognition that, in spite of 
its apparently manifest corruption, the machine was satisfying basic latent functions was the 
beginning of a scientific analysis of the phenomenon. 
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In fact, Merton argued, the machine historically had fulfilled such functions, including the 
organization of power in an atmosphere in which political authority was legally fragmented, the 
humanizing and personalizing of assistance to what Mertron called the "deprived classes," the 
provision of a route of social mobility for those with limited opportunities elsewhere, and the 
provision of political privileges-to business which stabilized the economic situation. Failure to 
. . recognize such functions led reformers to indulge in "social ritual rather than social engineering." 
(25)  
Imports and Exports 
For a generation of historians ~ ~ h o  were, as  Richard Hofstadter was to write in 1955 "far 
more conscious of those things they would like to preserve than they are of those things they 
would like to change," Merton's apparently scientific assault on the moralism of pre-war r2form 
was a useful tool in the construction of a "usable" past for New Deal style liberalism. Therefore, 
the classic accounts of urban politics in Oscar Handlin's 1951 book The Uprooted and Richard 
. . 
Hofstadter's 1955 book The Age of Reform imported these conceptions into history. It  was these 
conceptions that were exported into political science to bolster the opinions of Herring which 
underlay the accounts of machine politics written in the early nineteen sixties by Theodore Lowi 
and Edward C. Banfield and James Q.  Wilson. (26) 
For Handlin the urban machines were the crucial link in the immigrants' political 
acculturation. The boss had usually arisen from among the immigrants and "remained one with 
them," championing the little man against the big and seeing to the ward and neighborhood issues, 
such a s  housing, employment, etc. that affected the immigrants' day-to-day existence. For 
Hofstadter, who based his account of machine politics entirely on Handlin, the easygoing and 
pragmatic boss understood the immigrant's desire for concrete personal gains from political 
participation because he worked within a political ethos which sprang from the urgent needs [of 
the immigrants] that so often grew out of their migration." For both historians, the focus of 
reformers on the alleged corruption and fiscal extravagance of the bosses was misplaced 
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"moralism." More important was the fact that through the functions they fulfilled, the bosses 
placed human needs above "inherited notions and inhibitions," and in so doing, according to 
Handlin, they prevented socialism and radicalism from taking root among the immigrants. (27) 
I t  was no coincidence, of course, that these bosses looked a lot like FDR. Merton himself 
had exemplified the way the machine "humanized and personalized" aid to the needy with a 
footnote referring to a story about Harry Hopkins' work under Roosevelt. Handlin argued that it 
was the machine that "opened to the immigrants the prospect that the state might be the means 
through which the beginnings of security could come," although it was not until the New Deal that 
immigrants were no longer "divided by the necessity of choosing between their own machines and 
reform," because by then reform had changed so that it could "swallow up their machines, bosses 
and all." Hofstadter's admiration of the boss's "pragmatic talents," and the machine's essential 
humanity," was paralleled in his praise of FDR's opportunistic virtuosity and the ability of the 
New Deal to put human needs above "inherited notions." Like the machines the New Deal 
avoided moralism and simply went about the business of dealing pragmatically with politics and 
society as it found them. Meanwhile, the opponents of the New Deal shared with the opponents of 
the political machine an inability to accept the changes in their status brought about by 
industrialization, immigration, and urbanization, and their political movements were, in fact, 
"moralistic binges." (28) 
The description of machine and reform "political style" presented by Theodore Lowi in his 
1964 book At the Pleasure of the Mayor was based entirely on the categories of Handlin and 
Hofstadter, as was that in City Politics, published by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson in 
1965. Banfield and Wilson turned the "political ethos" argument on its head by approving of the 
"middle class" ethos that Hofstadter and Handlin scorned. They did not follow this with a 
condemnation of the machine, however, because of their concern for the machine's centralization 
of urban authority. Whatever its ethical faults, they argued, the machine was apparently able to 
overcome the decentralization of urban political authority which blocked the undertaking of public 
projects. For this reason, it was never to be compared to "ideal" alternatives, and, in some 
instances, it was preferable to any alternative likely to appear on the urban political scene. Lowi 
argued somewhat similarly that an "honest" machine that centralized authority for the public good 
might be the solution to the crisis of urban government. (29) 
Social Science History and The Revival of Ethnicity 
For -the first generation of postwar brokers between history and the social sciences like 
Handlin and Hofstadter the social sciences were a grab bag into which historians could reach for 
ideas without necessarily transforming the discipline itself. Although both were open to the 
instruction of the social sciences, they were not convinced that history should become one. 
Moreover, both were more deeply involved in the reconstruction of American history along the 
lines of the "new" liberalism than in the reconstitution of history as a social science. 
For the first generation of their more social scientific successors, however, like Lee Benson 
and Samuel P. Hays, the goal was to use the social sciences to transform history itself, to develop 
a "social scientific" history which focused on the structure of social and political behavior and 
avoided the focus on "episode and ideology" in the naive political narratives of their predecessors. 
For the most part, these historians were oblivious to the politics of either "empirical social science" 
itself or the specific middle range frameworks they borrowed. Benson turned to Merton's theory 
of "reference groups" as  a way of understanding how there could be any meaningful political 
conflict in an economically consensual society; Hays inserted Merton's conception of "locals and 
cosmopolitans" into a modernization framework a s  a way of explaining the change in 
consciousness brought about by the modernizing thrust of American social development. 
For Benson and Hays the work of the generation of Handlin and Hofstadter was both 
insufficiently "scientific" and, for Hays a t  least, too closely tied to the "liberal" interpretation of 
American politics. Both argued that political history was episodic and too little concerned with the 
"structure" of political behavior over time or across space. Both also felt that this focus on 
"episode and ideology" turned American history into what Benson referred to a s  a "Hobbesian" 
world in which every historian worked for himself and there was little hope for the development of 
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a properly "professional" (read scientific) community which could produce cumulative empirical 
results. Their turn to the "empirical" social sciences for a model of professional reorganization 
was, therefore, predictable, and, on the whole beneficial, if somewhat naive. But both their 
historiographical indebtedness to their predecessors and their selection of models and ideas from 
the social sciences kept their revolution from being more than "halfway." (30) 
- . .  Benson, for example, predicated his well known work The Concept of Jacksonian 
Democracy on the search for the bases of political conflict in a society lacking fundamental 
economic conflict. This work, which is rightly perceived as  one of the founding texts of the 
"ethnocultural" interpretation of American political history is often wrongly remembered as  a 
"test" of the relative ability of class and ethnicity to explain political behavior. In fact, Benson 
defined the former out of his inquiry, declaring this work to be an extension of "the 
complementary theses" of consensus presented by Hartz and Hofstadter. According to Benson, 
Hofstadter had "enlarged and sharpened our vision" with the insight that no significant group had 
challenged the legitimacy of a capitalist system of political economy in the United States and 
Hartz had revealed the same about political theory. (31) 
In spite of this agreement on some fundamentals, Benson argued, conflict could and did 
occur in the series of stages best illuminated by Merton's theory of reference groups: 
ethnocultural "issues" like temperance or sabbatarianism created groups, groups became reference 
points (either positive or negative), reference points became continuing political roles. This view, 
according to Benson was superior to that which held that disagreements arose from "the 
simultaneous existence of different stages of society" or "clashing economic interests." As he was 
later to explain, "cultural attributes have much greater potential than economic attributes to 
function as the basis of social groups ...(b ecause they) tend strongly to function as  the primary 
reference groups that men 'naturally' turn to when they engage in the myriad types of conflict 
endemic in the capitalist epoch." (32) 
However, this argument, too, was influenced to a great extent by the theoretical 
framework within which it was framed. Benson's turn to Merton was a turn, as  others have 
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noted, to a n  essentially voluntaristic theory of action, a non-structural theory of "group" 
formation, and a system in which the role of power was relatively underdeveloped. Merton's 
theory of reference groups was based upon the theory of relative deprivation, and contended that  
attitudes and action were more influenced by the groups with which one identified--positively or 
negatively--than by one's social structural situation. As Piotr Sztompka has  pointed out, what is 
important in.this theory is "clearly the idea of reference (i.e. relativisation), and not the idea of 
group." In  fact, it is not completely clear in Merton's account what a "group" is or from where 
.groups come. Merton's theory was well matched with Benson's assumption that  there were no 
fundamental economic structural differences in American society. But this framework did not, 
could not, permit a "test" of the relative political salience of class and ethnicity. (33) 
Reflecting his interest in social history, Hays' work was more social "structural" than that  
of Benson. Moreover, Hays blasted the work of Hofstadter for its emphasis on the role of the 
"middle class" in urban reform and its reliance on the analysis of middle class "ideology" in its 
theory of progressivism. Structurally generated struggles for power were the centerpiece of the 
works of Hays and the reason for his popularity among those who attacked consensus history. 
(34) 
As I have written elsewhere, however, the cutting edge of Hays work was dulled by its 
definition of "structure" in essentially structural-functional terms. In a 1965 essay on the "social 
analysis" of American political history Hays called for attention to the "systematizing and 
organizing processes inherent in industrialism as the dynamic force in social change in modern 
life" and the structure of relationships--between "locals and cosmopolitans"--which those processes 
generated. More than just these terms were borrowed from Merton, however, so also was 
Merton's explanation of the "relative proportions" of locals and cosmopolitans in different 
communities as  resulting from "characteristic forms of environing social structure with their 
distinctive functional requirements." (35) 
By 1974 in a n  essay on the political structure of the American city this structuring process 
had blossomed into a "constant tension between forces making for decentralization and forces 
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making for centralization in human relations and institutions," and a political system "shaped and 
reshaped" according to the "inner dynamic" of the changing economic and social order. If in 
Benson politics was detached from structure, in Hays politics was overwhelmed by it; "structures" 
and "processes" generated reified worldviews which took the place of conflicting political actors. 
. (36) 
. .  . The successors to Benson and Hays in the "new" political history, including most 
. . prominently Paul Kleppner and Richard Jensen, extended both the historical claims and empirical 
reach of ethnocultural political history, arguing flatly tha t  "partisan affiliations were not rooted in 
economic class distinction," and "religion was the fundamental source of political conflict in the 
midwest." But a s  Jensen himself has written, the theoretical framework within which these 
authors worked was essentially a functionalist one. Their question was what were the functions 
of politics in nineteenth century America. Assuming, like the founders of the field, that  it was not 
to advance-economic interests, they argued that it was  to solidify those that  were "cultural." (37) 
Moreover, within this framework even apparently "economic" issues--e.g. the tariff--were 
viewed as really only culturally symbolic; flags, as i t  were, so that  voters motivated primarily by 
local ethnocultural issues knew for which party to vote. The reinterpretation of "economic" issues 
a s  "cultural" was important to this framework because, as Richard L. McCormick has pointed out, 
only a tiny fraction of public policy in the nineteenth century involved distinctively ethnocultural 
issues; the majority of public policymaking involved clearly economic issues. (38) 
The possibility that  these issues have been wrongly interpreted a s  cultural is raised by a 
series of penetrating essays on the methodology of these--and other--works in the ethnocultural 
political school by J. Morgan Kousser and Allan J. Lichtman which have undermined their 
quantitative infrastructure. In essence, these authors contend that the ethnocultural historians 
either have not conducted the multivariate tests of ethnicity and class that  they claim to have 
done or have not conducted them properly. Historians who have seen these critiques as  so much 
"hair-splitting" among quantitative historians--for whom they feel little sympathy in any event-- 
2 1 
not only misunderstand the gravity of the criticism but belie their own commitment to historical 
"facts," as  well as the ethnocultural historians' often repeated claim to social scientific status. (39) 
The Persistence of Pluralism in the "New" Social History 
The construction of a "social" analysis of politics by Benson and Hays was 
contemporaneously accompanied by a broader turn to social history by the so-called "new" urban 
historians beginning with Stephan Thernstrom. These analysts focused primarily on "societyM-- 
actually social mobility--rather than politics, and employed the community study as  both object 
and method. The implicit and explicit theory of these studies was pluralist; pluralism both 
rationalized their separation of politics and society and explained the--usually poorly examined-- 
links between social and political mobility. 
Because of its role in +.he community power debates of the nineteen sixties, pluralist theory 
is often thought of a s  primarily a set of statements about "who governs" in contemporary 
America. In the work of Robert Dahl it was this, of course, but also much more. I t  was a 
dynamic and historical theory of politics which attempted to explain the relationship between 
political ideology and institutions, economic development and political development, individual 
mobility and political consciousness, and, ultimately, "society" and the "state." (40) 
In his Preface to Democratic Theory, published in 1956, Dahl laid down a fundamental 
principle of his work--and his generation--in the argument that institutions like the constitution 
were less important guarantors of American democracy than the widespread "consensus" that 
underlay them. "Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the 
underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant portion of 
the politically active members." Acting on this belief, Dahl embarked upon the construction of 
what today would be regarded a s  a "society-centered" theory of politics to explain the role and 
reproduction of this consensus in his more widely read 1961 book, Who Governs. (41) 
The famous "Book I. From Oligarchy to Pluralism" in Dahl's Who Governs presented a 
sophisticated, apparently empirical, resolutely behavioral, and easily generalizable theory of the 
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development of American local politics that was to have an enormous impact on historians. At a 
high level of generality, Dahl argued that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries New 
Haven--and by invited extension, American communities everywhere--had been ruled by 
interlocked socioeconomic, political, and a t  times religious elites. However the effects of large- 
scale social changes like industrialization, immigration, and population growth were to destroy the 
socioeconomic basis of this elite by creating new sources of economic power, generating greater 
social complexity and permitting population growth. All of these changes multiplied the bases of 
political power and, thereby, the number of political elites. As society became a mosaic of groups, 
the rational approach to politics was one rooted in political conflict among self-interest groups--or 
their leaders--whose goals were short-term, pragmatic, negotiable, and capable of being fulfilled 
within the existing framework of social and political institutions of American society. Agreement 
on these conditions formed a consensus on the rules of the game, and competition among the many 
groups maintained a rough political equilibrium. (42) 
This socioeconomically driven shift from "cumulative" to "dispersed" inequality in 
American society was facilitated by the expansion of the state produced by a linkage between 
political integration and social mobility. In New Haven, new socioeconomic groups--especially 
ethnic groups--entered society a t  the bottom and experienced an initial period when their 
"proletarian" status prevented them from engaging in political activity. However, as  members of 
the group began to achieve lower middle class economic status and therefore had the leisure to 
work in politics, they began to experience political mobility as  well; as more members of the group 
became active the public sector grew in response to their needs through a patronage-based process 
similar to the "latent" functions described by Merton. 
This was not, however, the only similarity to Merton's analysis. Equally important was a 
theory of psychological mobility very similar to that espoused by Merton. For Dahl, to begin with, 
there was "no distinctive working class outlook that could be formed into an ideology and program 
different from that already expressed in middle class ideals." This was because of the social 
mobility process, in which "each generation of workers was enormously more prosperous than its 
parents in a seemingly endless expansion of gains." Even if there had been such an outlook, of 
course, the process of ethnic mobility outlined above would have undercut it. Ethnics entered as 
"proletarians,"--thereby fragmenting class--but soon moved up the class ladder in his three stage 
explanation of political assimilation which ended when the ethnics "have middle class ideas, adopt 
a middle class style of life, ... and look to others. in the middling strata for friends, associates, 
marriage partners." Or, in other words, both workers as workers and workers as ethnics had 
"middle class" reference groups. (43) 
In Stephan Thernstrom's classic 1964 book, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a 
Nineteenth Century City, the relationship between politics and social structure was mediated so 
explicitly by Dahl's theory that the book made a powerful political statement almost in spite of its 
location in the "new" social history. Ostensibly an analysis of the life chances of immigrant 
laborers in nineteenth century Newburyport Massachusetts, Thernstrom's book was also a test of 
the "rags to riches" thesis in American history. Its argument that the range of occupational 
mobility was distinctly narrower than the conventional framework suggested was delivered as  a 
criticism of the "consensus" assumption of ever increasing abundance. However, its claim that a 
"mobility ideology" was widespread in American society and its linkage of social mobility and 
political integration--a linkage taken directly from Dahl--turned it into the social historical 
equivalent of Dahl himself. (44) 
I t  cannot be said that without Dahl there would have been no Thernstrom because the 
book was deeply influenced by the work of Handlin, who was Thernstrom's advisor. Handlin was 
obsessed with the impact of mobility on social integration and, as Ian Tyrell has pointed out, his 
books were organized around the question of how7 society can be reintegrated after it is 
decomposed by mobility or rapid social change. The fact that the narrative structure of 
Thernstrom's book, therefore, goes from an integrated "Federalist" Newburyport, disruption 
through industrialization, population growth and immigration, to a final stage of social and 
political reintegration is attributable, in part, to Handlin's influence. (45) 
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However, this framework not only recapitulated that  of Dahl's from a New Haven ruled by 
the "Patricians" to one ruled by the "Ex-plebesn--as Thernstrom fully acknowledges in his 
footnotes--but also made a very similar connection between social and political mobility. Following 
Hofstadter and Hartz explicitly Thernstrom argued tha t  in Newburyport--as in Dahl's New 
Haven--party politics were consensus politics to begin with because of the relative absence of 
conflict over social and economic policy. As in New Haven, the interlocking elite of Federalist 
Newburyport was smashed by industrialization and immigration and replaced with a variety of 
overlapping voluntary groups. As in New Haven, the local political arena was "open to ambitious 
[immigrant] men of talent" and the Irish-born who rose in politics were "precisely those who had 
risen dramatically in the occupational and property spheresw--the "entrepreneurs" in Dahl's 
scheme. As importantly, Thernstrom believed he had found the "social roots of consensus politics" 
in what he called the "mobility ideology." Even a t  the bottom of the class ladder there were 
abundant opportunities for modest self-advancement and, therefore "Horatio Alger was a primary 
symbol of the American political tradition." Consensus politics in Newburyport were based on the 
genuine absence of "the desperate economic grievances and the rigid social barriers which fed the 
class-based parties ... of the old world." (46) 
Thernstrom thought he had discovered the social correlate of Dahl's "democratic creed" in 
his notion of the "mobility ideology." In  fact the process was the opposite; Thernstrom worked 
from Dahl's conception of consensus as  articulated in Who Governs in 1961 to construct both the 
social function and political implications of the mobility ideology in 1964. 
Pluralist Neo-Marxists 
Under the influence of the British marxist labor historians like E. P. Thompson American 
social historians after Thernstrom transformed the study of "mobility" into the study of "class 
formation," and in so doing demonstrated that  the "mobility ideology" was an inadequate 
description of the ideology of the American working class just as the process of "mobility" in no 
way captured the entire experience of capitalist industrialization. (47) 
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In  effect, in response to the pluralist separation of economy and polity the historians of the 
working class rejoined these spheres by politicizing production, arguing effectively that  the 
"economic" is "political" in the sense that the relations of production produce with them certain 
relations of domination and ideological justifications for tha t  domination. Their careful 
reconstructions of the patterns of work and -their detailed exegesis of a wide variety of sources for 
.. . understanding working class "culture," revealed the-interweaving of economics, politics, and 
ideology in the sphere of production. Similar attention was  not, however, lavished on the workings 
of politics; in many of these studies, in fact, politics was a crucial but residual category explained 
in recognizably pluralist terms. 
This pattern was se t  in one of the first direct responses to the work of Thernstrom, Alan 
Dawley's Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn, which was published in 
1976. By means of the techniques above, Dawley successfully challenged the understanding of 
class, mobility, and ideology characteristic of the social historical "mobility" studies since 
Thernstrom. In his brief analysis of politics, however, which lacked entirely the care and subtlety 
of his analysis of production, he "discovered" what he called the "same process" in Lynn as  Dahl 
had described in New Haven. In  Lynn "local politics provided a convincing demonstration to wage 
earners that  men from their own ranks could rise to the highest position in honor in their 
community," and this reinforced the ideological legitimacy of the political system while, a t  the 
same time, "pork-barrel temptations" lured most working class voters away from a workingmen's 
party and back to the two regular parties. In his view, contrary to Thernstrom, Horatio Alger 
was out: "every mass action, every collective expression of opinion identifies Horatio Alger as  an 
outcast in the minds of Lynn workers. Electoral politics, not faith in occupational success or 
property ownership was the main safety valve of working class discontent." Ironically, however, 
the ballot box was, in Dawley's now famous phrase, "the coffin of class consciousness" because 
Robert Dahl had said i t  was. (48) 
This "new" framework for the understanding of class and politics was to be repeated in 
many studies influenced by Dawley's. For example, Daniel Walkowitz's Worker City, Company 
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Town found that "the dominant liberal social and political ideology of progress undermined labor's -
class consciousness, while social mobility and the political process both provided experiences that 
confirmed that ideology." In Troy, New York, class and ethnicity reinforced one another among 
the Irish in the 1850s and 1860s, but by the 1880s an  Irish bourgeoisie and political machine 
- emerged. Irish politicians--still an important symbol of immigrant mobility, success, and power-- 
"circumscribed class politics." In Susan Hirsch's study of antebellum Newark, Roots of the 
American Working Class, the first generation of workers used politics as  an arena for cultural 
conflict and thereafter, increased immigration blocked the development of class politics by 
extending the hold of ethnic politics. "The urban political machine organized immigrant working 
class voters into ethnic blocks, socializing them to an American politics that gave them symbolic 
achievements ... as well a s  personal aid." (49) 
These neo-marxist community studies--and others like them--ended with pluralist 
understanding of politics for reasons having to do both with marxian theory and their own 
historical practice. As, among others, Erik Wright has pointed out, the understanding of "the 
political" in marxian theory was not one of its most fruitful formulations. Politics entered marxist 
analysis primarily in two ways, in the moment a t  which and process by which a class shifted from 
its purely economic existence "in itself' to its political existence "for itself," and in the political 
institution that was essential for reproducing the structure of capitalist economic relations. In 
crude hands the process of class formation was completely teleological, the pattern of state action, 
wholly instrumental, and as late a s  1977 Ralph Miliband complained about both of these problems 
in the Marxian theory of democratic politics. (50) 
This theoretical problem was compounded by both the amount and the type of attention 
these studies devoted to politics. Because the focus of all of them was on class formation not 
political formation, politics was invariably considered in a seemingly obligatory, but always brief 
and inadequate single chapter. Moreover, the analytical style of these chapters was remarkable 
different from those dealing with class. While the former were usually structural, quantitative, 
and detailed the "analysis" of politics resorted to the "old" political history with a vengeance: a 
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narration of personalities, intrigue, and manipulation with barely a nod to systematic analysis of 
the behavior of the electorate or the polity itself. This tendency has been carried to an extreme in 
Sean Wilentz's widely praised new book on the formation of the New York City working class. 
There the politics of the Workingmen's Parties of the eighteen thirties are rendered in loving detail 
while the representatives of the "regular" parties lurk in the background only as  shadowy 
opportunists and manipulators. (5 1) 
Ironically, in all of these studies this barely analyzed, essentially residual, and 
traditionally related, category then becomes the most compelling reason for the failure of class 
consciousness to move from the shop floor to the ballot box or beyond. Lacking a well-developed 
alternative, the connection between economy and polity is, as we have seen, made by means of a 
jury-rigged version of Dahl's framework. Dahl's theory was, after all, "base" driven--the shift 
from cumulative to dispersed inequalities was brought about in large part by socioeconomic 
change--and it maintained that  political interests were generated outside the political arena then 
brought into it where they were disciplined, perhaps combined, and adjudicated. The simple 
addition of an instrumental theory of the state and a hegemonic interpretation of "consensus" 
allowed its transformation. (52) 
Taking Politics Seriously 
Among others, Theda Skocpol has  noted the important ways in which pluralist, 
functionalist, and marxist theories parallel one another in their "society-centeredness." In each of 
these frameworks--which of course overlap and interact--politics and the state are constituted by 
rather than constitutive of society. At one level, therefore, the construction of a conception of 
American politics emphasizing ethnicity, patronage, and machines represents only this tendency 
toward the subsumption of the state by society in the social sciences since World War Two. 
Recognition that  states are "weighty actors" with their "own" histories may in due course correct 
this problem. (53) 
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This essay has tried to point out, however, that the problem is more complicated than that. 
Across the social sciences the effort to use historical and institutional means to "bring the state 
back in" is contaminated by the conceptual residues of a particular moment in American history 
when the identities of and connections among social science, history, liberalism, and the state were 
redefined. It  is said that hegemony~is accomplished when the views of one class become the 
"common sense" of another. Few would deny that it is just "common sense" that American urban 
politics involves ethnicity, patronage,. and machines. 
Of course, no one would argue that'ethnicity or patronage were irrelevant to nineteenth 
century American politics, nor would anyone claim that there were no political machines. The 
question is whether or not these foci enrich or impoverish the conception of the state a t  the 
subnational level. A brief review of the contributions and limitations of the literatures we have 
considered here demonstrates the ways in which they interact to narrow the consideration of the 
state. 
The contribution of the ethnocultural political literature has been the rediscovery of the 
. . .  
breadth and significance of political participation in nineteenth century America. The problem of 
this work has been its failure to connect participation and policy formation; its reduction of politics 
to cultural symbolism has produced a state which does not act to produce an authoritative 
allocation of resources or play an active role in the economic constitution or transformation of 
society. (54) 
The contribution of the neo-marxist community studies has been the reintroduction into 
American history of class and conflict a s  social and political realities. Moreover, this works 
suggests that political economic issues--from the control of police to the maintenance of common 
lands--were of great importance. However, acceptance of a view of the state as  primarily an 
arena of symbolism, ideological manipulation, or pure and simple "pork-barrelism" has led this 
literature to a sort of imperialistic economism in which the process of production has been the only 
or a t  least the most important location for the production of political ideology. This has led these 
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historians either to ignore or trivialize the power of political ideology to shape social and economic 
ideologies. 
The contribution of the historically oriented political scientists like Katznelson, Shefter, and 
Bridges has been a shift from the "social" to the "political" roles of machine politics; from 
machines as uncritical respondents to "needs" of the urban masses to political organizations with 
their own imperatives. The problem of this literature is the centrality and inevitably of machine 
politics itself; assumption that the machines are the key to American political development. 
Taken together, these approaches "shrink" the state. Taking politics seriously requires its 
expansion; the recognition of the manifold ways in which politics helped to constitute nineteenth 
century American society. The legislative and judicial branches of the state and local levels of the 
American state were fundamentally and continuously involved in the definition and redefinition of 
"public" and "private" in terms of property, interests, and realms of action, and those activities 
were continuously salient politically. 
In its everyday actions the state was continuously conferring privileges and creating--or 
extracting--resources and thereby constituting conflicting political actors and their ideological 
representations of their actions. Both these actions and the role of the state itself were 
enormously controversial. By doing some damage to subtleties of their thought, one can range 
nineteenth century state ideology on a continuum from Federalists, Whigs, and Mugwump 
Republicans on the one hand, to the Jeffersonian Republicans, and Jacksonian and "Bourbon" 
Democrats on the other. For the former, an active state was a guarantor of stability, economic 
development, and, ultimately, social harmony. For the latter, it presaged corruption and the 
disruption of a "natural" social harmony as well as  the domination of those favored by political- 
economic privileges over those without those privileges. Ironically, whatever other socioeconomic 
changes were to transpire in nineteenth century America, these ideological poles in the debate 
over the role of the state would persist. (55) 
Furthermore, positions on the state and political democracy were linked unpredictably. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, those who professed to place their faith in "the People" 
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objected to the expanding state while those who tended toward political elitism lauded such 
expansion. Whigs before the Civil War and Mugwumps afterward favored an  expanding state but 
limited suffrage; pre-Civil War Jacksonian Democrats and post-Civil War Bourbon Democrats 
favored mass political mobilization and a small state. Those, therefore, whom one might have 
expected to expand the state purely for patronage reasons did not necessarily do so on ideological 
grounds, while those who favored expanding the state objected to political patronage beyond a 
certain level. 
In the course of these battles, the "agrarians" and "aristocrats," "producers" and 
"drones," "people*' and "monopolists" were groups whose material reality and ideological status 
were created in and by the state. Only by ignoring political ideology can labor historians contend 
that  the "producer" ideology emerged a t  the point of production to become the language of class in 
America. In fact this ideology emerged out of political combat and was appropriated by working 
class organizations. I t  is this, origin, of course, which explains its ability simultaneously to 
facilitate and obstruct radical action. Moreover, it is in par t  for this reason that  labor historians 
have avoided detailed comparisons of "labor" and "party" ideology: they contain many of the 
same ideas. (56) 
Against this background of contentious state action, the battle over the so-called 
ethnocultural issues--e.g. the enforcement of temperance, sabbatarianism, etc.--was also a battle 
over the extension--or retention--of state authority over society. Moreover, the political alignments 
on these issues were similar to those on others; Whigs and Republicans favored state action on 
ethnocultural issues and in other areas; Democrats opposed the former and campaigned actively 
for retrenchment a t  both local and state levels. Ethnocultural political alignments were not 
necessarily, therefore, just symbolically expressive, but also linked to prior positions on 
economically related activities of the state. 
In fact the post civil war political era  a t  the state and local levels opened not with 
ethnocultural issues but with assaults on the activities of the pre-war and wartime state in the 
public debt limitation campaigns conducted in state after state following the War. When the 1880 
census surveyed these limitations on the state and local public sector for the first time, it found 
that 15 of the 38 states had added debt restriction provisions to their constitutions, while three 
others had authorized legislatures to do so. Twenty four of the thirty eight states had restricted 
the right of cities to invest in railways, twenty five barred them from investing in private 
corporations. All but three of the constitutional debt ceilings were adopted before 1877, indicating 
that they were not just responses to the "panic" of the mid-1870s, but had to do with more deep 
seated reactions to state economic and fiscal activities. Historians have, for the most part, ignored 
these movements, in spite of their rich potential for revealing the "sense" of the state in these 
years. (57) 
In addition to creating resources, of course, the state extracted them; state activity was 
controversial in part because it was costly. Statistics on property ownership and geographical 
mobility suggest that it is probable that the highly mobilized post-Civil War electorate was 
constituted both a s  voters and as "taxpayers" especially in the urban areas, but, again, the latter 
identity has been almost ignored. Nationwide the level of non-farm homeownership--and thus 
eligibility for property taxation--was about 37 percent in 1890. Moreover, this homeownership 
spread remarkably deeply down the class structure, a s  it was not unusual for immigrants to own 
homes a t  a higher rate than the native born and for a s  much as 40 percent of skilled workers to 
own homes. I t  is also the case in mobility studies that those who accumulated property were 
those most likely to stay in one place and that homeownership was age specific--those who aged in 
one place were very likely to own homes. (58) 
Because the most important qualification for suffrage in the late nineteenth century was 
residence and those most likely to stay in one place were also likely to accumulate real property 
and thus pay property tax, it is very likely that the relationship between spreading tax liability 
and increasing political participation was not coincidental. For example, throughout the 
nineteenth century the most highly mobilized ethnic group was the Irish, who were also the ethnic 
group with the highest rate of homeownership in many cities. However, a s  Stephan Thernstrom 
has pointed out, this property accumulation was achieved by means of what he calls "ruthless 
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underconsumption," and the hold of immigrants on their property was tenuous at best. This new 
work suggests that groups which have been thought to be proponents of the expansion of 
government had more interest in stopping that expansion since the only guaranteed result of such 
expansion was an increased tax bill. (59) 
The question of resources and costs brings us back to the literature on the political 
machine which has been blissfully unaware of these issues. The functional model of the political 
machine provided a license for historically oriented social scientists to "discover" machines in city 
after city by ripping urban politics out of its institutional, ideological, and fiscal contexts. More 
recent historical and comparative work has produced abundant evidence that the all-powerful 
urban boss rarely, if ever, existed. In fact, urban politics was simply too contested, urban 
policymaking too complicated, and urban policymakers--believe it or not--too responsible to support 
the image of the all-powerful urban boss. There were, of course, politicians a t  precinct, ward, and 
city levels who were called "bosses," and some of these men headed political and other 
organizations that could dispense "patronage" of widely varying amounts and types and could a t  
times "deliver" some votes. But there were remarkably few "machines" that controlled city-wide 
political offices for long periods of time, there is remarkably little evidence that political 
organizations either wanted or had the resources to meet the needs of the urban masses, and 
there is no evidence that the presence of "machines" fundamentally affected patterns of political 
mobilization. (60) 
All of these problems and more are revealed, for example, by reading back to back the 
accounts of New York City politics written by Wilentz, Bridges, Shefter and David Hammack, in 
which there is almost - no agreement on when the "machine" became the "machine," or exactly 
what difference that made. The variety in these accounts, however, testifies to the ability of these 
authors to discover the complexity of politics in New York city; the problem is the attempt to jam 
that complexity into the "machine" straight-jacket. (61) 
Considering the various ways that the sub-national state helped to constitute society by 
acting or refusing to act, the various issues around which political mobilization occurred or failed 
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to.occur and the various ideologies that  these actions generated, the most damning thing that can 
be said about the view of politics from ethnicity, patronage, and machines is simply that  i t  is an  
extraordinarily narrow way of viewing the relationship between state and society in America. 
This narrowness is not surprising given the circumstances out of which this view emerged; its 
persistence is, however, given the wealth of tasks entailed in "bringing the state back in" to 
American history. . 
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